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POWER IN A CHANGING WORLD

Harry Arthurs
Remarks to the Graduate Law Student Conference
Osgoode Hall Law School
May 6, 2005

The people in this room represent the future of Canadian legal
scholarship. I read admissions files, supervise graduate students,
sit on dissertation committees, participate in oral examinations
and evaluate graduate programs. I know that legal scholarship has
never been in better hands.
In my title, I promised to introduce you to a number of strange
legal creatures, starting with the spider. I’m a man of my word; in
fact, I’m better than my word. I’m going to begin by introducing
you not to one spider but to two.
In the first sentence of his history of English law Frederick
Maitland famously said that “the law is a seamless web” which he
hesitated to disturb by plucking at one strand. The metaphor is
striking. It endows law with qualities of strength and adaptability.
It assumes the continuity and coherence of law. It suggests that
law is produced by an all-powerful juridical spider which designs
and executes the law with genius and tenacity, or in, in a more
modern version, which merely extrudes it in the form of a
naturally occurring social protein.
The spider’s web metaphor reappears in the writings of Lon Fuller
100 years later. Fuller argued that many social problems are
polycentric – like a spider’s web. Pull at one strand and you
disturb another. Markets, for Fuller, were the quintessential
polycentric problem. Attempt to regulate one aspect of market
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relations and you immediately trigger unexpected and unwanted
consequences elsewhere. Fuller even offered a graduate seminar at
Harvard on the state and economic life – a very irritating seminar,
actually. It was built on the premise that it is essentially
impossible to regulate market behaviour by law. Fuller’s spider
web, oddly, gets tangled up with Maitland’s in much of what
emanates today from the World Bank, the law and economics
movement and other neo-liberal propagandists for the rule of law.
Law is the indispensable instrument of governance, they argue: it
is just and it is rational; it protects us from oppression by the state;
it is the foundation of our freedom, security and prosperity. But
law, they say, should never be used to interfere with markets.
Not to belabour the obvious, but these encounters with spiders
remind us that judges, lawyers and legal scholars often disguise
law’s ideological content by making legal institutions and
outcomes seem natural, inevitable and immutable rather than the
product of human agency and the expression of ideological belief
and social choices.
Next, the bee. The bee doesn’t appear by name in the famous case
of Harrison v Carswell. However, there is no other way of
explaining the majority and minority judgments which were
written by two of Canada’s finest judges. The case involved the
right of a striking employee to picket in the shopping centre where
her employer was located. The majority judgment of Mr Justice
Dickson held that the landlord had a common law property right,
enforceable under the Petty Trespass Act, to exclude the picket as
a trespasser, and that only the legislature could take away that
right. Chief Justice Laskin, dissenting, argued that under certain
circumstances, trespassers may enjoy a privilege which overrides
the landowner’s right to control access. As it happens, I studied
property law with Laskin, and I remember the point precisely: if
you are raising bees on your property, and they escape from the
hive, you have a privilege to trespass on your neighbour’s property
to recover them, so long as you are in hot pursuit.
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Laskin himself was clearly in hot pursuit of a way to legalize
picketing in shopping centres, a most worthy objective; and
Dickson was hotly pursuing an equally worthy objective:
defending democratically elected legislatures against judicial
adventurism. Alas, their good intentions and hot pursuits took
these two fine judges madly off in opposite directions. Law, it
seems, can be expressed in the form of admirable and indisputable
legal principles whose application produces totally contradictory
results. You choose your principle; you determine your outcome.
Or more accurately, you decide on your outcome and then choose
your principle. Law, even for excellent lawyers, is result driven.
And now the snail. Everyone knows about the snail: its presence
at the bottom of Mrs Donaghue’s ginger beer bottle prompted the
House of Lords to articulate a principle of negligence law which
allowed her to sue the manufacturer of the drink, rather than the
shopkeeper who sold it to her friend. Yes: everyone knows that
snail. But thanks to some excellent legal historians, we now also
know that Donaghue v Stevenson never went to trial; that there
remains considerable doubt about whether the snail ever existed;
and that it is by no means clear that Mrs Dohaghue was drinking
ginger beer.
Law, as it turns out, requires no empirical foundation to command
obedience; it needs only to be rhetorically compelling, to appear to
be just or sensible and to emanate from high authority.
Finally, the camel. William Twining - like Maitland, an historian
and legal theorist - tells the story of how as a young law teacher in
Khartoum, he introduced his students to an English tort case in
which a child was bitten by a camel in the London Zoo. “Please
sir,” a Sudanese student asked “What’s a camel doing in a zoo?”
That question, says Twining, changed his understanding of law,
and launched him on his famous theory of “law in context” – an
important early contribution to socio-legal studies.
Law, according to Twining, does have an empirical foundation
after all. It is a series of culturally contingent sub-systems which
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are shaped by the specificities of time and place. Law in context,
then, really is a camel. It is a bigger and more complex idea than
the spider, the bee or the snail. It has two humps: it challenges
both traditional views of law as decreed by God or nature, and
contemporary attempts to describe law as a universal or global
phenomenon. Like camels which apparently cannot reproduce
without human assistance, Twining’s insight reminds us that law
is a human artefact, as ubiquitous, various, perverse and sociable
as humans themselves. And finally, once having pushed its way,
camel-like, into the tent of legal consciousness, there’s no getting
rid of this idea.
So there you are: a brief history of legal thought over the past
hundred and fifty years: from legal formalism, positivism and
natural law to legal realism, functionalism, and pluralism. I
haven’t quite made it all the way to postmodernism, I admit. But
since postmodernists hold that it is the reader who ultimately
imparts meaning to the text, you are free at this point to nominate
your own favourite animal.
My objective, however, is not to leave you with a history or
taxonomy of legal thought. It is to show how these differing ideas
about law shape what I might call the political economy of legal
scholarship.
Whether one thinks of law as a profession, as a university
discipline, as a cultural phenomenon or as an institution of social
control, at the centre of one’s understanding is a set of
assumptions about legal knowledge. Legal practice is different
from accountancy or medicine because lawyers know things and
do things that doctors and accountants don’t and can’t. Law
schools are different from philosophy or psychology departments
because legal academics read different books, use a different
vocabulary and employ different methodologies. Law is different
from, say, the visual or performing arts because it conveys its
symbolic and emotive messages through different conventions of
dramaturgy. And law is different from the market or the church as
a technique of social control because it employs different
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strategies of persuasion and coercion. In each case, the assumption
is that there is something distinctively “legal” which ultimately
has to do with the nature of legal knowledge.
However, I’m giving law the benefit of the doubt when I say that
legal knowledge is different. For reasons you can readily imagine,
an excellent case can be made that law is a derivative discipline,
that for the past 100 years or so it has been borrowing much of
what it knows from other fields of study, that there isn’t much
that is distinctively legal knowledge, and to the extent there is, it’s
pretty suspect. Law’s distain for empirical facts and systemic
analysis are but two of many examples. Put all of that off to one
side.
What I want to say is that even taking at face value the claim that
there is a distinct and describable corpus of knowledge that we
might label “law,” it is clear that law people disagree strongly
amongst themselves over what that corpus might comprise.
For practitioners, what they don’t need to know in their own
practice might as well not exist. Stop any tax lawyer on Bay St.;
ask her or him about criminal law or intellectual property, and
chances are you will get a blank stare. Stop any lawyer in a small
town and ask about securities law or constitutional law, and
you’re pretty sure to get a look of incomprehension or worse. And
being utterly frank, stop any law professor and ask about fields
other than those she or he teaches and writes about, and you may
well find equal puzzlement. The only lawyers likely to profess
omniscience are those you’ll find on the bench. Because our courts
are courts of general jurisdiction, it’s understandable that they
should claim to be able to transcend their professional specialties.
However, after reading their judgments, one sometimes has to
wonder whether a little more judicial modesty wouldn’t be
appropriate.
I want to say, next, that the internal division of knowledge
amongst lawyers, both reflects and requires a division of legal
labour. It also reflects and requires a division of wealth and power.
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Legal labour is divided in several ways. First, it is divided in terms
of professional specialization, as I have already suggested. Tax
lawyers and criminal lawyers, constitutional lawyers and
securities lawyers obviously inhabit different universes of
discourse – unless of course you believe, with Maitland, that the
law is a seamless web. It is also divided amongst those who
litigate and those who advise, those who judge and those who
produce legal knowledge. But law is also socially stratified. At the
top of the legal hierarchy are those who increasingly work in
nation-wide and trans-national blue ribbon firms which serve a
predominantly corporate clientele, and practice almost exclusively
in areas of interest to these clients. They are at the top not just
because they associate most closely with the rich and powerful,
enjoy the greatest financial and psychic rewards, and exercise the
greatest influence in public affairs and the economy. They are also
at the top because they get the chance to do the most complicated
and interesting legal work, which brings them great professional
recognition and esteem. At the bottom of the professional
hierarchy are solo practitioners and lawyers in small firms who
typically serve individual working class or middle class clients in
local communities, earn relatively modest incomes performing
what are often fairly routine tasks, and gain influence and prestige,
if at all, only in their own community and amongst lawyers of
their own kind. Finally, the hierarchy within the profession to
some extent reproduces social stratification in the wider society.
The usual suspects – recent immigrants, women, and people of
colour – have a difficult time penetrating the elite firms and tend
to congregate elsewhere in the profession.
So: who you are in the legal community, what you do in that
community, to some extent determines what you know about law.
That’s relatively easy and uncontroversial. Now, however, I want
to make a harder and more important argument. So far I have
been talking about different domains of legal knowledge – criminal
law, taxation and so forth. Now I want to argue that there are also
profound differences in legal epistemology – in what we
understand law to be. This requires me to revisit the menagerie I

2005]

THE SPIDER, THE BEE, THE SNAIL AND THE CAMEL

7

described at the beginning of my talk. Spiders, bees, snails and
camels have different understandings of the world they inhabit.
It is difficult to say which animal represents legal practitioners.
They don’t act like spiders, for sure. Lawyers who work with legal
rules know that law is no seamless web; nor do they want it to be:
they want to be able to pick and choose, to pluck and tear so that
they can weave together the arguments they need to advance the
interests of their clients, whatever the consequences for the
coherence of the legal system. On the other hand, lawyers tend to
talk as if they believed in the seamless web theory of law, and they
often exhibit the same antipathy to state regulation that lay at the
heart of Fuller’s spider metaphor.
If not spiders, are practitioners snails? Almost certainly not: if
practitioners were called on to demonstrate that legal rules have
some basis in empirical reality, they would be in deep trouble. I’m
about to publish an article in which I and my co-author argue that
the Charter may well be a non-event. As the empirical evidence
shows, it hasn’t changed Canadian society very much, and it isn’t
likely to do so. If we’re right, this article ought to be deeply
unsettling for Canada’s finest and most idealistic advocates. But it
won’t be. They will dispute our evidence; they will challenge our
logic; and they will make every effort to retain their world-view
intact, to insist that the Charter has been a transformative event.
My point is not that they are wrong and I am right; it is that they
will not know how to engage – will not wish to engage - with the
empirical evidence we are putting forward.
Practitioners and judges come closer to being bees than anything
else. As Harrison v Carswell reminds us, even the best of them is
prepared to use any expedient argument, seize on any useful
theory of the case, to make the result come out the way they think
it ought to. And, paradoxically, I’m going to argue that
practitioners are part-camel as well. Like Twining’s Sudanese
student, they have an intuitive sense that law is context-specific.
Contract principles which seem to govern employment contracts
may not be very useful in the context of banking or property
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transactions; which jurisdiction and whose court you get tried in
is very important if you’re facing a criminal charge; the meaning of
words in a statute depends on its history and purpose; and how
one resolves disputes in the entertainment industry may differ
greatly from the way they’re resolved in construction.
And what about us – “us” meaning legal intellectuals and
academics? We naturally have strong affinities with lawyers and
judges. We speak the same language, though not necessarily the
same dialect. We share the same basic law school education,
though ours is modified by subsequent graduate studies. We
measure our successes, in part, by the extent to which we are able
to convince lawyers and judges to look at legal issues in a
particular way. So in some ways, we have a recognizable
connection to the creatures that can be found in any courtroom or
law office. But in other ways, we are as different from most
practitioners and judges as Darwin’s birds and turtles out there on
the Galapigos are from their distant relatives in Patagonia or Pago
Pago.
In part, the differences can be seen as an extension of the division
of labour which exists in professional practice. We also have our
specialties though we tend to view them more reflectively and
critically than most practitioners. In part, too, scholars can be
seen as a social stratum within the profession, somewhere
between solo practitioners and members of large law firms. Our
incomes are comparable to those of the lower orders of the bar,
though our perqs and benefits are probably better. On the other
hand, we resemble members of prestigious law firms in several
respects: we generally did pretty well at law school; we do
important and worthy work; we enjoy a reasonably high profile
both within the profession and in the public domain. But unlike
members of these law firms, we choose to lead our lives in less
privileged precincts.
In part, this says something about our temperament and values,
about how we prefer to work, with whom and for whom, and on
what. However, what mostly sets us apart from practitioners is
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our epistemology. Most practitioners look at law from the inside
out. That is, they take legal rules and institutions and practices
pretty much as a given, and then try to work with them. Legal
intellectuals, on the other hand, generally treat law as a subject of
enquiry; they look at it from the outside in and try to understand
not only what it is and how it works, but what are its social causes
and consequences. This arm’s length relationship from law
testifies to the extent to which we have detached ourselves from
Maitland’s view, which for most legal intellectuals has long since
ceased to be a credible account of the nature of law. Instead we
have committed ourselves to the kind of broad philosophical,
social and cultural enquiry which enables us not only to go off in
hot pursuit of Laskin’s bees, but also to expose the absence of
Donaghue’s snail and meditate on the significance of Twining’s
camel.
I’m not saying that legal academics have ceased to do traditional
legal analytical work, or that they should cease. Indeed, in areas
such as tax law and constitutional law, they do analytical work of
great elegance and distinction. Rather, I’m saying that if legal
analysis is all they do, it’s not enough. All their hypotheses would
be dubious, all their arguments incomplete, all their conclusions
suspect, because they will have failed to make use of the full range
of intellectual tools available to them.
Those useful tools, of course, are not distinctively “legal” and they
are not really ours. We borrow them, sometimes shamelessly,
from our neighbours in economics, literary theory, sociology or
political science. And to be honest, they are often tools which
have been subject to a good deal of axe-grinding by liberals and
neo-liberals, by feminists and critical race theorists. In other
words, the people who design, use and sharpen them often have an
ideological agenda as well as an intellectual one – as who does not?
The result is that innovation and critique in law are largely
derived from other disciplines, whether this is explicitly
acknowledged or not.
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This is a point worth dwelling on for a moment.
Interdisciplinarity may be essential for serious scholarly work in
law; but few of us who do that kind of work are properly qualified
for it. And how could we be? I wrote a book on legal history
without knowing the first thing about historiography. I’ve done
surveys and interviews without studying sociology and I’ve taught
a course in political science with nothing more to go on than the
courses I took as an undergraduate. I’m not boasting; I’m
embarrassed. And so should we all be, because our commitment to
interdisciplinary scholarship almost inevitably exceeds our
competence. Of course, no one person could be possibly be
knowledgeable in the dozen or so disciplines necessary to function
as well-informed legal intellectuals. That’s why I think that
graduate programs in law ought to set themselves two modest
goals: (1) to ensure that future legal scholars demonstrate basic
fluency in at least one of the social sciences, and (2) to ensure that
they acquire skills and attitudes which will help them to work in
partnership with colleagues in other disciplines.
Now let me move on to the next stage of my argument. On the
one hand, we have the practising bench and bar: still spiders at
some level - true believers in the coherence of law, even though
they ought to know better - and still bees – opportunists who will
use any argument that works. On the other hand, we have legal
intellectuals who may not actually themselves search for snails or
herd camels, but are nonetheless committed to the crucial
importance of such activities. These two groups clearly create,
possess, dispense and are defined by, different kinds of knowledge.
The one locates itself at the core of the legal community, the other
at its periphery. They have different “relevant others,” different
lifestyles, different values, different hierarchies and different
rituals and rewards. And not least, they espouse different
ideologies, with different degrees of explicitness and selfconsciousness.
These differences manifest themselves in debates over the content
of the law school curriculum, over bar admission and continuing
education programs, over what judges ought to read and how
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litigants ought to make arguments, over the extent of selfcongratulation or self-flagellation that is appropriate for the bar’s
public utterances, over the propriety of appointing law professors
to the bench and practitioners to law faculties, over the kind of
evidence needed to assess the working of legal institutions or to
justify law reform initiatives – and most of all, over what law is
and what it does.
These debates amount to something like a culture war amongst
people who embrace competing visions of law and legal
knowledge. But not just a culture war. To the extent that these
competing visions have a significant ideological content, this is a
political struggle as well. Law and economics, feminist theory,
critical legal studies, liberal legalism: these embrace radically
divergent visions of the public good, of democratic process, of the
role of the state, of the very terrain of politics. And the war isn’t
just cultural and political: it is economic too. Remember: legal
intellectuals and legal practitioners earn their livelihoods and their
reputations by preaching and practising their respective versions of
legal knowledge. Radical changes in legal practice or legal
education enhance or diminish the value of their intellectual
capital and the returns that capital earns them.
Culture, politics, economics: these are words we use when we talk
about power. But power doesn’t exist in a vacuum, at least not a
vacuum called “law.” Law isn’t sealed off from the broad political
economy; it is part of it. It is therefore profoundly influenced by
globalization and neo-liberalism – forces which are transforming
virtually all power relations, including those based on legal
knowledge.
Globalization has changed the world of legal academe enormously.
It looms large as a topic of scholarly writing; it has carved out a
niche in law school curricula and syllabi; it has inspired some
fairly radical experiments with trans-national and trans-systemic
law degrees; it has bought law professors tickets to conferences all
‘round the world. As you can imagine, all of this represents a
major change in our consciousness and imagination, in the range
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of sources scholars must read and the people they talk to. More
important yet, globalization forces us to revisit long-standing
assumptions about how to regulate economic and social
behaviour. Statutes passed by national legislatures don’t take us
very far when it comes to regulating global markets for money,
natural resources, intellectual property or labour. But so far there
is no global political process, no global legislature, no global
regulatory regimes. The result is that much market based activity
effectively escapes regulation. Dissatisfaction with this situation
has led, in turn, to the invention of new non-state mechanisms of
regulation which are of great interest to legal scholars – or at least
to those who take an expansive view of law.
Finally, at the level of legal theory, globalization pits Maitland
against Twining, spider people against camel people. Spider
people claim that, in a global age, law too must be global, and that
pending some means for making it so, domestic law must be built
upon a platform of universally accepted legal norms including
human rights, an independent judiciary, the rule of law, respect for
property and free markets. Camel people, on the other hand, do
not see domestic law as global law waiting to happen. In fact, they
emphasize the power and persistence of local politics, local
culture, local societies and local law.
These few examples will explain why I think that globalization
has generally enlivened legal scholarship. But of course we have
paid a price. For Canada, globalization means integration into the
American economy. Whether they approve or oppose integration,
Canadian scholars therefore find themselves at risk of being
absorbed into debates framed up by American ideology, public
policy, law and legal-academic culture. In some other academic
disciplines – economics for example – similar developments have
greatly diminished the attention paid by scholars to Canadian
issues. I hope law will not go the same way; but it certainly could.
However, the direct effects of globalization on the legal scholarly
community are as nothing compared to its impact on the
Canadian bar.
By transforming the Canadian economy,
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globalization has shrunk the domestic market for high-end legal
services, harmonized away some of the distinctive elements of
Canadian law thereby making irrelevant much of what Canadian
lawyers know, lured many of our best and brightest young lawyers
to practice opportunities offshore and – though it’s too soon to tell
- possibly launched a process which will end up with Canada’s
major leading law firms reincarnated as branch plants of foreign
based global law firms. This is likely to have a profound impact
on our legal institutions and processes, on what our students
expect to be taught, and how legal scholars define their agendas.
The progress of globalization has proceeded in tandem with – has
been a key factor in - the rise of neo liberalism. Over the past ten
or twenty years, the Canadian state has retreated considerably
from the role it played in social and economic life from, say, the
1940s to the 1960s or 1970s. This retreat has had important
consequences for legal scholars, students and practitioners. For
one thing, there’s less money: less to support legal research, less to
subsidize the costs of legal education, less to pay for academic
“frills,” less to pay for legal aid plans and public sector law jobs.
For another, there’s less regulatory activity by the state. Land use
and environmental law, labour law, human rights and securities
regulation have all dwindled in importance as sources of legal
work and of academic inspiration. True, some of the slack has
been taken up by the Charter which has become a leading field of
academic research and appellate litigation. But overall, the
reduction of the state’s role in the economy has been paralleled by
a reduction in the presence of regulatory issues on academic
bookshelves and on lawyers’ Blackberries and Daytimers.
By far the most important effect of the rise of neo-liberalism, is
that we seem to be launched on a long-term transition from an
“old normal” to a “new normal.” For people of my generation, and
those born through to the end of the 1960s, the “old normal”
meant that the state would provide and the state would protect. If
the state didn’t do that, the state was in default of its obligations
to its citizens. Allowing for disagreements over degrees and
modalities of state intervention, it is still broadly true to say that
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most legal scholars during that period had been brought up to
expect and applaud the activist state. Well, those people begat
disciples and their disciples begat more disciples. However, at
some point – just about now - the blood lines begin to run thin.
More recent generations of students will have grown up in an era
when state activism is regarded as exceptional and presumptively
undesirable. They are likely to react very differently than I did to
the notion that people need jobs or pensions or protection against
the economic power of large corporations. “Let the market
provide” tomorrow’s legal scholars are likely to say, “or fix it with
the Charter;” but not “let’s invoke the regulatory and
redistributive apparatus of the state.”
In short, because of globalization and neo liberalism, many of the
deep structures and hidden assumptions of postwar legal
scholarship are coming under increasing stress as the old normal is
slowly being displaced by the new normal. The result will be, I
predict, increasing dissonance between the old progressive
scholarship of the postwar period and the new neo-liberal
paradigm of the state and legal system; this in turn will cause great
intergenerational stress in the legal-intellectual community.
You - the people in this room, the next generation of legal scholars
and intellectuals – are going to find yourselves right in the middle
of all that dissonance and all that stress. In fact, you and your
contemporaries will be the cause of it. But fear not: as someone
who generated a good deal of dissonance and stress in his time, I
promise you that being involved in these fundamental, paradigmshattering debates will be the making of you. Spiders, snails, bees,
camels: name your animal. You and your colleagues will have the
opportunity - you will have the responsibility - of redefining the
very nature of law and of legal knowledge.
What a challenge. I wish I were on the other side of this lectern,
starting all over again!

